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Introduction
Imagine you are the attorney for the New York Yankees. Soon after the World Series,
you get a call from the Boston Red Sox attorney demanding that you share your marketing
profits for the past year. You try to keep from laughing out loud, but kindly refuse to offer any
amount of money to your archenemy. The Sox attorney continues on stating that if you do not
turn over a portion of your profits, he will sue the New York Yankees and George Steinbrenner
for breach of fiduciary duty. He claims that MLB Properties is a close corporation and as a
league owner, and therefore shareholder of MLB Properties, your actions with respect to
marketing violate your fiduciary duty to the league. You politely decline again and hang up the
phone. Your next thought is: fiduciary what? In a close what?1
Now consider, that your buddy from college calls up and ask you to invest a small
amount of money in his new corporation. You help him out by buying 5% of the corporation. A
few years later you open up a business of your own. A few days later after opening, your buddy
class demanding that you will owe him your profits because you are an investor in his business.
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Again, fiduciary duties and close corporation shareholder is mentioned in the heated
conversation. Your next thought is: fiduciary what? In a close what?
While the above situations are hypothetical, the issue of minority shareholders owing a
duty to the majority in a close corporation is far from hypothetical. It has been reality for at least
20 years and still remains unsettled. It is this reality that founders of businesses need to be aware
of before making a choice of entity. Two types of entities are generally available to a founder:
partnerships and limited liability entities. Choosing one entity over the other typically involves
analyzing tax, administrative and liability issues. Oversimplified, the choice is between greater
administrative flexibility (partnerships), or limited liability (corporations). However, what is
almost never considered, or glossed over, is the impact of fiduciary duties on the owners of the
business. Fiduciary duties are a set of behavioral rules that owners agree to follow. Generally,
partners owe each other and the partnership these duties. They agree to act with the highest
regard to each other. On the other side of the continuum are shareholders of a corporation.
Except in limited circumstances, they do not owe anyone fiduciary duties. For some the choice
is easy, choose limited liability and one can act freely with one’s investment.
Unfortunately, a special case exists within close corporations that demand discussion
about fiduciary duties by corporate planners. Courts have imposed partner-like fiduciary duties
on corporation-like shareholders. A partner who desires to limit liability in a partnership
exchanges control for limited liability in the partnership. Generally, any shareholder in a
corporation need not worry about liability, but involvement in a close corporation morphs the
relationship into one resembling an “incorporated partnership.” Like a partner in a partnership,
the minority shareholder in a close corporation must deal fairly with his fellow shareholders.
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Unlike a shareholder in a corporation however, the minority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to
the majority.
The purpose of this paper is to warn close corporation participants, especially minority
investors, of the special duties one incurs by being involved with a close corporation. Part I
outlines the primary concepts involved in choosing an entity. Part II discusses the close
corporation and the evolution of the minority shareholder fiduciary duty and two opposing views
of the status of the fiduciary duty in the close corporation. Part III proposes advice to persons
forming businesses and investors in close corporations generally to deal with the potential
consequences of these expanded fiduciary duties.
I. Choice of Entity Decision
One of the early decisions founders face in starting a new business is the choice of entity.
In today’s environment, numerous business forms are available to choose from: Partnerships,
Limited Partnerships, S and C Corporations, LLC, LLP, LLLP are just some of these forms. The
decision is primarily based on liability limits, tax impacts, management, and financing that
generally boil down to administrative ease vs. limited liability. However, little attention is paid
to considering fiduciary duties of the participants in the chosen entity.2 This section will briefly
outline four primary factors in choosing an entity and discuss the differences between
partnerships and corporations.3
A. Liability Limits
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The main difference between a partnership and corporation concerning liability is simple:
unlimited liability vs. limited liability. Partners in a general partnership are jointly and severally
liable for the entity’s obligations.4 In other words, a partner’s liability can be unlimited.5 For
example, if the partnership takes a loan from a creditor and defaults, each partner is separately
liable for the whole debt.6 Similarly, if while conducting business a partnership employee or
partner commits a tort, all partners can be personally liable for the consequences of the tort.7
This means one can sue the partnership and the partners individually and gain access to their
partnership and individual assets.8 Furthermore, liability is not limited by the amount of a
partner’s investment.9 So, a 10% minority partner will be liable for 100% of the partnership
obligations.10
A corporation is a creature of statute.11 One or more shareholders that file incorporation
papers with a particular state can form a corporation.12 Shareholders who form the corporation
are not liable for the entity’s obligations, except in extremely limited circumstances.13 Nor are
the shareholders personally liable for the actions of the corporation, its officers or its directors.14
So, a shareholder risks only the amount of investment placed with the corporation.15
B. Tax Treatment
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The main differences in tax treatment of these entities concerns income/loss distribution,
timing, and complexity. Partnerships are considered flow-through entities meaning income at
the entity level is not taxed.16 Income and deductions are passed on to the individual partners.17
The partners include these items on their individual tax returns according to tax rules that apply
to individuals.18 All income in the partnership is imputed to the partners regardless if it is
actually distributed to them or not.19 This is an important concept for smaller businesses.
Partners are not considered employees in the tax sense; they are partners. Their income will not
be limited to an arbitrary salary. Rather the partner will be taxed on his distributive share.
Additionally, partners do not have control over the timing of their income or losses. All income
or loss items must be reported (that is distributed) on a yearly basis whether cash is actually
received by the partner or not. So it is possible that in a partnership that generates $1 million in
income, the partner will pay taxes based on the $1 million even though the partners agreed to
give themselves $30,000 a year in “salary.”
The desirability of this form stems from the pass through of losses to the partners.20
Because depreciation or other expenses could create losses even when there may be a cash gain,
the partners may be able to set off personal income and lower their personal marginal tax rates.21
However, a partner’s loss is limited by the amount of basis a partner has in his interest in the
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partnership.22 The larger and more complicated a partnership becomes, the more sophisticated
and complex the tax planning can become.23
A corporation’s taxing system appears much simpler. Corporations are taxed as separate
entities.24 They declare income and take deductions in a manner similar to individuals.25
Shareholders generally receive their return on investment through dividends or sale of their
stock.26 This income is again taxed creating the primary disadvantage of the corporate form:
double taxation.27 A shareholder receiving dividends is usually taxed at higher ordinary income
levels. A corporation does not pass through its losses, so a shareholder cannot use the
corporation to offset gain. If the shares in the corporation decline in value or become worthless,
the shareholder is able to takes appropriate losses upon sale or disposition of the shares.
The advantages of the corporate form directly offset the disadvantages of partnership
taxation. A corporation does not need to distribute income causing unwanted gains for
shareholders.28 It has flexibility in timing its distributions.29 Net operating losses can be carried
forward year to year to offset future income.30 And accounting for a shareholder’s investment in
the firm is simple: a share is directly proportional to the firm’s total value. An additional benefit
for the small business is that owners can be paid corporate salaries that are considered deductible
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employee expenses.31 So, a small business corporation can pay out most of its income in salaries
to the shareholder-employees and avoid double taxation. The income is taxed only once; it is
taxed only at the shareholder level as ordinary income.
C. Management
Differences in management of the entities are theoretical more than practical as savvy
planning and well-thought out contracts can easily make one entity manage like the other.
Partners manage the partnership through the partnership agreement.32 The agreement may be
formal or informal.33 Each partner is able to act for and bind the partnership, however, this may
be varied by agreement.34 The default is that each partner is considered equal and has a right to
equally manage the partnership.35 Each partner is assumed to have authority to bind the
partnership except in specific circumstances that require written statements to be filed with
authorities.36 Unmodified by agreement, issues are decided by majority vote of the partners
regardless of the amount of capital contributed to the partnership.37 No formal meeting or other
requirements are imposed upon a partnership’s management. Lastly, any partner may dissolve
the partnership by simply stating he no longer wishes to be a partner or through a partner’s death.
Once this event happens, the partnership must wind up and dissolve.38
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Corporations are creatures of statute. Owners must formally file incorporation papers
with the state in order to be recognized.39 Minimal, but formal, requirements are imposed upon
the operation of a corporation such as requirements to hold at least annual meetings, procedures
for calling meeting, and electing of directors.40 Shareholders elect management by voting for
directors according to a shareholder agreement made during incorporation.41 Unmodified by
agreement, one share equals one vote. Directors then choose officers to manage the corporation
on a daily basis.42 Only officers and directors may act for or bind the corporation; shareholders
have no power to act in the name of the corporation.43 A corporation’s existence is perpetual. It
is dissolved through shareholder action. Unlike the partnership, one shareholder cannot alone
dissolve the entity.
Techniques, as well as other entities, exist for planners and entrepreneurs to be able to
choose the best of both worlds concerning liability, taxation and management. Thus, it may
appear that the choice of entity decision has little meaning as long as one can plan around the
disadvantages through contract. However, the concept of fiduciary duty rains on the planner’s
parade. A different set of fiduciary duties is imposed upon business participants depending on
the entity chosen. While these duties may not affect how the outside world deals with the entity,
they have a major affect upon the interactions between the owners of the business. This decision
is rarely addressed between those starting a business and can have important implications in the
operation of the business and the conduct of the participants including investors desiring

39

Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.01, 2.02.
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.05, 7.01.
41
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.05, 8.03.
42
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.40.
43
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01.
40

8

passivity.44 The next section discusses the importance of understanding this decision. Choosing
an entity is basically choosing the rules by which the owners wish to be governed. Choosing the
wrong set can have serious implications for owners and investors when things go awry.
D. Fiduciary Duties
A fiduciary duty is the highest standard implied by law requiring one to act for the
interests of another, while subordinating one’s own interests.45 Fiduciary relationships are found
in many areas of law including attorney-client, executor-heir, and principal-agent relationships.46
Part of American law since its beginning, its definition to this day lacks precision.47 The concept
originated with English courts of equity and from the law of trusts.48 Other relationships with
trust-like attributes also were adjudicated under this concept that became known as fiduciary
law.49 The two most fundamental fiduciary duties are: (1) the duty of care, and (2) the duty of
loyalty.50 Derived from the law of agency, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary (1) not to
compete with the partnership; (2) not to profit from the relationship at the expense of the
partnership or partners; (3) to refrain from adverse conduct; and (4) to not disclose confidential
information.51
1. Partnership fiduciary duty
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Partners are fiduciaries to the partnership and each other.52 Of the above fiduciary duties,
only the duty of loyalty and care are required of a partner.53 Case law development began with
the landmark case Meinhard v. Salmon54 which imposed fiduciary duties on co-adventurers
holding that “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.”55 That standard of behavior is the “duty of the finest loyalty.”56
Meinhard involved two joint venturers who entered into an agreement to lease and manage a
building.57 Near the end of the lease Salmon secured a lease from the owner for another new
business opportunity.58 He kept the opportunity to himself and did not share it with Meinhard.59
Meinhard successfully sued Salmon stating that the fiduciary duty between partners required
Salmon to share the opportunity with Meinhard and allow him the chance to compete.60
2. Corporate fiduciary duty
Unlike the partners in a partnership, shareholders in a corporation do not owe a fiduciary
duty to each other or to the corporation.61 Corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation.62 In general these directors and officers do not owe a duty to the
shareholders.63 However, through shareholder derivative suits, shareholders are able to protect
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their investments due to a breach of fiduciary duty.64 In some cases, controlling shareholders
also owe fiduciary duties either to the minority shareholders, the corporation, or both.65 These
duties are balanced by court developed doctrines such as the business judgment rule allowing
directors and officers to escape liability by showing they honestly believed their actions were in
the best interests of the corporation.66
A problem with the court application of fiduciary duties is that courts have written
“opinions that, while correct, have generally failed to articulate the principles underlying their
rulings and have relied instead on rhetoric, frequently with moral overtones.”67 This method of
development of fiduciary law as applied separately to partnerships or corporation appears to be
sufficient.68 However, as applied to close corporations, which exhibit attributes of both
partnerships and corporation, fiduciary analysis breaks down.69 If choosing an entity means
choosing the set of rules one wants to be governed under, the lack of underlying principles for
fiduciary breaches has created a serious issue for the planner and owners desiring the close
corporation business form. The next section explores the development of fiduciary duties in the
close corporation and explains how the minority shareholder, usually in a vulnerable position,
has come to owe fiduciary duties to the majority.

II. The Close Corporation
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Although the lion’s share of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, close
corporations generally incorporate in the state they do business.70 Ninety percent of all
corporations are close corporations.71 Of those corporations, few elect close corporation status.72
Close corporations are defined by statute in some states and loosely defined by common law in
others.73 A close corporation is typically one where shareholders are few, the stock is not
publicly traded, and the shareholders are most often the directors, officers, and employees of the
corporation.74 Frequently, close corporation shareholders have invested significant percentages
of their total wealth in the business and expect the investment to be a major source of income.75
As a result of all these factors, close corporation shareholders, especially minority shareholders,
may seem trapped in their investment with little hope of exit.76
A close corporation is typically managed by all or most of the shareholders.77 That is, the
shareholders are also the directors and officers of the company.78 A minority shareholder is
dependent upon the majority to make fair and balanced decisions because the minority has no
managerial control.79 Power to make decisions such as employment or dividend declarations can
easily be abused by the majority.80 For example, the majority could fire a minority shareholder-
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employee and refuse to declare dividends.81 Because close corporation shares are not readily
available to the public, the minority is unable to easily dispose of his shares.82 Thus, the
shareholder is trapped in a non-performing investment.83
A problem is created because participants in a close corporation generally do not seek
comprehensive legal advice.84 Due to this fact, many close corporation shareholders are
uninformed as to their rights and duties and do not seek to incorporate their expectations in
contractual form.85 Most close corporation litigation revolves around majority shareholders, in
their role as directors, officers or shareholders, exerting oppressive power over the minority.86
As a result, some states have enacted close corporation statutes altering some general corporation
rules intended to, among other things, benefit the minority shareholder.87 However, most
corporations who qualify for this status do not organize under these statutes.88 This is probably
attributable to incorporator ignorance, attorney disfavor, or trusting pre-existing relationships
between the shareholders.89
A. Development of a Minority Shareholder’s Fiduciary Duty
1. Fiduciary Duty for Majority Shareholders
Containing more morality than legality, Meinhard was the beginning of the road for
imposing fiduciary duties on a minority shareholder.90 Some states adopt Delaware’s approach
in refusing to attribute enhanced fiduciary duties to close corporation shareholders past that
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already imposed on public corporation shareholders.91 However, other states such as
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Illinois base their analysis on Meinhard and have adopted an
enhanced fiduciary duty that all shareholders, majority and minority alike, owe each other
fiduciary duties in a close corporation.92
In the corporate form, fiduciary duties are imposed between managers and the directors,
directors and the shareholders, and majority and minority shareholders. As stated above, the
“content” of fiduciary duties for public corporations can be fuzzy. However, courts view the
close corporation shareholder as being in a different category as their public shareholder
counterpart. In doing so, they have created a new area of law that applies fuzzy standards from
partnership law and corporation law to create an even fuzzier picture for a potential minority
shareholder considering an investment in a close corporation.93
Close Corporation Stockholder Fiduciary Duty: Two Views
Whether shareholders in a close corporation owe each other fiduciary duties has two
rather binary views: they do, or they do not. Delaware, where a majority of corporations are
incorporated, holds the minority view that closely held shareholders should not receive any
special benefits.94 Massachusetts, and the majority of states, takes the view that those same
shareholders should owe partner-like duties because of the intimate nature of the close
corporation.95
The Minority View:Nixon v. Blackwell 96
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Delaware adopted the minority view of close corporation fiduciary duties when its
highest court refused to uphold a trial court’s ruling that non-employee shareholders were
entitled to relief when employees received stock in a close corporation on different terms than
non-employees.97 Plaintiffs argued that by providing liquidity only for the employees through
the ESOP plan while excluding the minority shareholders was a breach of the director’s fiduciary
duties to the minority.98 The lower court agreed describing the plan as “inherently unfair.”99
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the ruling stating that Delaware corporation law does not
require all stockholders to be treated equally.100 The court explained that before investing in a
close corporation, minority shareholders have a variety of contractual provisions available to
them to protect their interests in the corporation.101 Any special relief for minority shareholders
in this instance would be inappropriate “judicial legislation.”102 Even though the corporation at
issue was not a statutory close corporation, the court also stated that the result probably would
not have been different.103 Coupled with Delaware’s longstanding “independent legal
significance” doctrine, whether a statutory close corporation or not, a minority shareholder
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cannot rely on enhanced fiduciary duties for protection.104 As a result, fiduciary duties will not
be imposed on minority shareholders.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England105
Donahue represents the majority view of enhanced fiduciary duties in a close corporation
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that stockholders in a close corporation
owed each other partner-like fiduciary duties.106 A minority shareholder, Euphemia Donahue,
sued the corporation, the directors, and the controlling shareholders for breach of a fiduciary
duty.107 Rodd Electrotype was a close corporation with the majority of ownership owned by the
Rodd family.108 When Harry Rodd, the most senior in the family, retired, the Rodd family
enacted a plan that included the corporation repurchasing his shares at less than liquidating or
book value.109 Donahue first learned of this action after it occurred and voted against a
resolution that would have ratified the action.110 Donahue later offered her shares to the
corporation but was denied.111
The court declared Rodd Electrotype a close corporation and held that all shareholders in
a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to each other.112 Ordinarily, a corporation may
repurchase its stock without prejudice to stockholders, however, a close corporation’s controlling
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stockholders also “must have acted with the utmost faith and loyalty to other stockholders.”113
This stricter requirement was imposed because minority stockholders have little opportunity to
protect themselves in these situations.114
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.115
Realizing this broad standard may cause trouble for majority shareholders acting as
directors and officers in effectively running the business, the court later narrowed its holding in
Wilkes by instituting a balancing test.116 Wilkes was a founding minority stockholder, treasurer
and employee of a nursing home qualifying as a close corporation.117 The expectation of the
founding shareholders was that each shareholder would receive compensation as long as each
was active within the business.118 Each active shareholder/officer was guaranteed a
directorship.119 Wilkes had been active in the management, and therefore elected as a director,
for over fifteen years.120 During this time, Wilkes and the other directors drew a salary from the
operational cash flow of the nursing home.121 Dividends were never declared.122 Year’s later,
“bad blood” developed between Wilkes and the other shareholders.123 As a result, three of the
four shareholders failed to re-elect Wilkes as a director or officer of the corporation that resulted
in Wilkes also losing his salary.124

113

Id. at 518.
Id.
115
353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
116
Id. at 663.
117
Id. at 659-660.
118
Id. at 660.
119
Id. at 660, n. 7.
120
Id. at 660, n. 9.
121
Id. at 660.
122
Id. at 663, n. 13.
123
Id. at 660.
124
Id.
114

17

The Wilkes court, concerned with “untempered application” of the Donahue standard,
fashioned a balancing test that allowed the majority to manage the corporation when the actions
taken were for legitimate business purposes.125 Once the majority demonstrates its actions were
taken for a legitimate business purpose, the minority must demonstrate that the action could have
been achieved in a practicably less harmful manner.126 Applying the standard to Wilkes, the
court found that the failure to elect Wilkes as a director originated from the tense relationship
between the shareholders and not any misconduct on Wilkes’ part.127 The court found that the
majority’s action disregarded the founding policy of employment with participation and the
knowledge no dividend had ever been declared which effectively lessened Wilkes return from
the corporation to zero.128 In reality, the majority attempted a freeze out, a type of action that
typically violates the majority’s fiduciary duty to the minority.
2. Fiduciary Duty for Minority Shareholders
Much has been written about the majority’s duty to the minority in close corporations
especially in the case of the majority oppressing the minority.129 Most case law and close
corporation statutes are concerned with protecting the minority interest in a close corporation
(rightfully so). One may think that a minority shareholder has little or no duty to the corporation
or the majority shareholders. However, Donahue left open a small hole, through dicta, that
imposes a fiduciary duty on the minority to the majority.130
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In Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.131, a minority shareholder who wielded veto power
over the majority was held to owe a fiduciary duty to the majority shareholders. Four investors
formed Atlantic Properties in order to manage a real estate concern.132 During incorporation,
each investor agreed to insert a provision that required an 80% affirmative vote of the Board of
Directors to effectively make any major decision regarding the corporation (“veto provision”).133
The corporation became profitable, retain a significant amount of its earnings, and later found
itself in trouble with the IRS due to unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits.134 As in so
many troubled cases involving close corporations, ill will developed between the shareholders.135
Due to the threat of IRS action, three shareholders wished Atlantic to declare dividends.136
However, Dr. Wolfson refused to vote to declare any dividend.137 As a result, the IRS fined
Atlantic.138
Exploiting a footnote in the Donahue court’s dicta139, the Smith court agreed that majority
shareholders can seek protection from a minority.140 Because the veto provision effectively
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made any minority shareholder a “controlling group,” Donahue and Wilkes were applicable to
the facts of the case.141 The court held Dr. Wolfson owed a fiduciary duty to the majority and
violated it according to the Wilkes balancing test because his conduct went beyond reasonable in
light of the warnings of penalties from the IRS.142
Although cases are few, the situations where the minority is found to owe a fiduciary
duty are actions better described as torts than breach of fiduciary duty.143 An early case, Helms
v. Duckworth, involved a 49% shareholder who negotiated a shareholder agreement requiring
each stockholder to place his shares in a trust.144 Upon death of either shareholder, the deceased
stock would be sold to the surviving member at the par value of $10 per share unless modified by
a subsequent agreement.145 The trust agreement also provided that the majority could not vote
for a dissolution or complete asset sale of the corporation without the minority’s consent.146 The
majority shareholder Helms, who was 70 when the agreement was made, later died without ever
having agreed to raise the value at which a surviving shareholder can buy the remaining stock.147
As a result, Duckworth was able to purchase Helms’ shares at $10 per share when the
corporation’s current value was $80 per share. The Appeals Court reversed the lower court’s
summary judgment for Duckworth holding that he owed Helms a fiduciary duty “to deal fairly,
honestly, and openly with . . . fellow stockholders . . . .”148 Finding that Duckworth never
intended to increase the stock purchase price, the court held that his bargaining tactics
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constituted a “flagrant breach of a fiduciary duty.”149 The court all but ignored any
misrepresentation or fraud analysis, but rather put itself in the shoes of the deceased and assumed
the agreement Helms made was not his intention.150
More confusion is created because states disagree whether minority shareholders who
have been frozen out still owe a fiduciary duty to the majority.151 In both cases, the minority
shareholder was “frozen out” by the majority.152 Yet, in one case the minority was allowed to
open a competing business,153 and in the other, the minority violated a lingering fiduciary
duty.154 The difference appeared to be in the minority’s conduct while being “frozen out.” In J
Bar H, the minority was wrongfully terminated and prevented from fulfilling her duties as a
director.155 Frustrated, she began a competing business.156 The court held she did not violate her
fiduciary duty even though she remained a director and shareholder.157 Treated as if she had
resigned, the court held that a wrongfully terminated shareholder/director/employee is effectively
stripped of any status that imposes a duty reasoning that “the fiduciary duty . . . depends on the
ability to exercise the status which creates it.”158
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The Seventh Circuit reached the opposite result explicitly refusing to accept the reasoning
in J Bar H.159 Gregory was a long-time employee of Rexford Rand before being fired by the
majority shareholder/directors.160 A few years later, the corporation failed to file its annual
report with the state and as a result was administratively dissolved.161 This caused its trade
names to become available.162 Discovering this fact, Gregory registered Rexford Rand’s trade
names preventing the corporation from re-incorporating under it original name.163 The Appeals
Court affirmed the lower court stating that the “freeze-out did not deprive Gregory of his status
of shareholder” and therefore he “should have placed the interests of the corporation above his
interests” and not appropriate the name in order to achieve the aim of a fair buyout of his stock
by the majority.164
Other than demonstrating that a minority’s fiduciary duties are far from settled, Helms, J
Bar H and Rexford reveal that a minority shareholder in a close corporation must walk softly.
Whether a fiduciary duty is owed to the majority appears not to be the central issue. Rather the
courts appear to apply a clean hands or tort-like analysis to the minority’s actions and declare a
fiduciary duty if they do not like what they see.165 Both minority shareholders in J Bar H and
Rexford held shares in their respective corporations at the time of the alleged duty breaching
actions.166 Each action the minority took, analyzed in a vacuum, is arguably a breach of
fiduciary duties. Applying partnership law suggests that these actions are breaches of fiduciary
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duties. Applying corporation law suggests the opposite. In either instance, it is important that
the planner include a discussion about fiduciary duties, not just limited liability or tax
consequences, in order for any shareholder to fully understand their responsibilities.
B. Implications for the Minority Shareholder
Typically, the disadvantages to being a minority shareholder can be contracted around.167
For example, venture capital firms taking a minority position develop shareholder agreements
that preserve the power to control the corporation and keep their investment liquid.168 Provisions
allow the firm to veto board decisions, control officer compensation, and require the majority
shareholders or the corporation to buy-out its shares.169 Also, electing close corporation status
provides additional protections for minority shareholders (e.g. dissolution requirements) not
available to public corporation minority shareholders.170
However, most statutes fail to further define fiduciary duties leaving interpretation to the
common law.171 The common law’s “progress has been uncertain and incomplete” leaving the
hole opened by Donahue and Smith as to when a minority investor may be violating his fiduciary
duty to the majority.172 In other words, how does one know when protecting one’s minority
investment crosses the fiduciary line?
As revealed bySmith , using veto power to overrule the majority causes the minority calls
into question the minority’s fiduciary duty. Arguably, the conduct of the minority doctor was
egregious, but this only substitutes one problem for another. If only egregious conduct violates a
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minority’s duty to the majority, what is egregious conduct? This refocuses the inquiry on one’s
conduct and forgets to answer the question whether a fiduciary duty should be imposed in the
first place. Focusing on minority shareholder conduct does not solve the problem either. J Bar
H and Rexford minority shareholders both took action in order to preserve their investment.
Both types of actions have been declared breaches of fiduciary duty in the past: opening a
competing business and appropriating corporate property for one’s own benefit. However,
another imperceptible line was drawn describing one action as a breach and the other not a
breach. Again, the discussion did not answer the question whether the minority should have
owed a duty to the majority in the first place.
So, if not in a state that has adopted Delaware’s philosophy, a minority shareholder must
realize that courts may analyze a minority shareholder’s assertion of power on the same level as
a majority’s action. The minority must also realize that he cannot frustrate the legitimate
business actions of the majority regardless of the power given up to him under contractual
agreements. According to Donahue and its progeny, any minority shareholder in a close
corporation may find itself violating fiduciary duties regardless of the size of its ownership.
From the case law above, a minority shareholder that attempts to use his power negotiated from
the majority to frustrate legitimate business goals will probably violate fiduciary duties to the
majority. However, it is unclear whether a minority with insignificant holdings in the close
corporation will be liable for other fiduciary duties.

III. Recommendations for the Planner
Investing in a close corporation is risky especially if a particular investor is in the
minority. Obviously understanding one’s rights when investing or founding a corporation makes
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for better legal and business decisions. Including discussion about fiduciary duties will give the
investor the complete picture about his investment. The following are simple recommendations
for making sure this issue will not come back to haunt the uninformed.
A. Be aware of both statutory and common law governing close corporations in your
jurisdiction. Delaware does not recognize close corporation fiduciary duties among shareholders
in common law or statutorily. Massachusetts has a judicially created doctrine and Minnesota has
codified enhanced fiduciary duties. The primary reason for these doctrines as applied to close
corporations is to protect shareholders and release administrative burden. However, as discussed
above, application to the close corporation is inconsistent. At its best, courts will prevent truly
egregious behavior on the part of a shareholder or group of shareholders. At its worst, a result
may be imposed that was never contracted for when the founders dreamed up their business.
B. Lawyers advising multi-owner founders need to add fiduciary duties to the discussion.
While these duties may not affect the tax treatment or liability of the entity, it may affect the
manner in which an owner wishes to manage his investment. The advantage of these duties is
that all shareholders are accountable to each other; the transaction cost of managing one’s
investment is low. Loyalty and careful management is expected. The disadvantage, however, is
that these duties may restrict the behavior of all the shareholders equally regardless of the size of
their investment. For example, a minority investor may not be able to invest in other businesses
if they are remotely related to the close corporation. Additionally, “compliance” with fiduciary
duties may increase the cost of managing the corporation. Justification of riskier business
decisions may mean initiating more discovery than would be required if fiduciary duties were
waived. So, it is possible the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages.
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C. Disclose the owners’ intentions with respect to fiduciary duties in the incorporation or
shareholder agreement. State simply whether the owners want fiduciary duties, including which
ones, or not. Unless the breaching behavior becomes especially egregious, the courts appear to
follow the intention of the parties to these contracts. It is possible that some portion of the duties
cannot be waived, however if the choice of entity is seen as choosing the set of rules one wishes
to be governed under, at least the “breaching party” can point to the original intention of the
parties.

IV. Conclusion
Investing is a risky business. Investing is a close corporation is riskier. Being a minority
investor in a close corporation keeps you up at night. To manage this risk, a number of
contractual and statutory provisions have been used to level the playing field. While the
minority investor gets some relief, this power equalization creates another problem: fiduciary
duties being imposed on the minority for unduly exercising its power gained from negotiating
with the majority. This paper has attempted to inform a minority stockholder where these duties
came from and where they could be applied. Hopefully armed with this information, minority
shareholders can negotiate and craft contractual provisions that still protect their investment, but
do not place themselves in a position of being sued for simply exercising their rights.
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